This article explores economic models that show the optimal level of information security investment in the presence of interdependent security risks. Using particular functional forms, the analysis shows that the relationship between the levels of security vulnerability and the levels of optimal security investments is affected by externalities caused by agents' correlated security risks. This article further illustrates that, compared to security investments in the situation of independent security risks, in order to maximize the expected benefits from security investments, an agent should invest a larger fraction of the expected loss from a security breach in the case of negative externalities, while an agent should spend a smaller fraction of the expected loss in the case of negative externalities.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Given the increased interconnectivity of the new Internet-based economy, the protection of intangible information assets has become as crucial as the protection of other tangible traditional assets Ogut et al. [2005] and Zhao et al. [2010] , the interdependent nature of information security risks distorts the decisions of economic parties about investment in information security. They argued that when interdependent information security risks cause positive externalities, firms are likely to invest less in information security than the socially optimal level. On the other hand, they also illustrated that when interdependent security risks generate negative externalities, firms are like to invest more than the socially optimal level. As a result, interdependent information security risks make it difficult to achieve the socially optimal level of security investment from a social planner's viewpoint.
The main interest of this study is this interdependent feature of information security risks.
Unlike the previous literature which mostly focused on independent information security risks, the aim of this study is to develop an economic model that sheds light on the relationship between an organization's security vulnerability and its information security investment in the situation of interdependent security risks. the vulnerability,   , is firm 's probability that an attempted attack of the given information set would be breached 1) ; and the investment,   , is firm 's pecuniary investment in information security to reduce the probability that an attempted breach of the given information set will be successful.   is assumed to have the same unit with the potential loss,   . In addition, in the G-L model, firm 's security breach probability function, denoted by        , is defined as the probability that firm 's information set with vul-1) Following , this study assumes that 0 <   < 1 since completely invulnerable information (i.e.,   = 0) such as perfectly unachievable information is not only undesirable but also very costly to be achieved, and it is not necessary to protect completely vulnerable information (i.e.,   = 1) such as public information.
nerability,   , will be breached given that firm  has made an information security investment of   to protect that information.   ⋅ is assumed to be continuously twice differentiable and to have declining returns with respect to   (i.e.,   ′ ⋅   and   ″ ⋅  ). Note that, for notational simplicity, the subscript, , is omitted.
In order to determine the optimal level of information security investment, the model solved the maximization problem of the expected net benefit function from an information security investment. That is,
 where    ⋅ is the expected benefit of an investment in information security and  is the cost of the investment.
2) The first-order condition for an information security investment, therefore, is
which shows, on the left hand side, the marginal benefits from IT security investment, equals, on the right hand side, the marginal cost of the investment. This implies that a firm can maximize the expected net benefits of information security investment when the difference between benefits and costs are maximized.   denotes the value which solves this maximization problem.
Since the optimal security investment equals zero if the marginal benefits are less than or equal to the marginal costs of the investment, it can
2) According to , this is the expected net benefits from an investment in information security.
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Since equation (2) does not provide further insights regarding the relationship between the levels of security vulnerability and investment, the G-L model employed two broad classes of security breach probability functions, which make it possible to identify a closed form solution for at a decreasing rate (see <Figure 1>). As a result, a firm which has a breach probability function belonging to this class would be better off increasing its security investment as security vulnerability increases. The G-L model also examined the second class of security breach probability functions (hereinafter referred to as 'Class II'). This class of security breach probability functions has the characteristic that, as the vulnerability of information set becomes extremely large, the protection of the information set can only be achieved at an extremely high cost.
Therefore, the optimal investment in information security first increases and then decreases in vulnerability. proposed the second class of security breach probability functions as:
where  denotes the productivity of information security (  ). Using equation (2) , the expression for the optimal level of security investment for Class II can be expressed as 4) :
For this class, equation (3) model the breach probability function as:
where   ⋅ is assumed to have the same properties with   ⋅, that is,   ′ ⋅   and   ″ ⋅   . This probability function implies that, if firm 1 makes a higher level of information security than does firm 2 (i.e.,      ), firm 1's security investment is more effective in decreasing its probability of a security breach. Therefore, from equation (8), the first class of security breach probability functions given by equation (4) can be rewritten by:
By assuming firm 1 and firm 2 are identical, the first-order condition of equation (2) can be expressed by 6) :
In contrast, there can be the case where security risks are interdependent and information security investments generate positive externalities: a firm's security investment for protecting systems against cyber attacks can reduce not only its probability of a security breach, but also that of others. To consider this situation, again, I as- A higher  indicates a higher degree of interconnection. Therefore, the breach probability function for firm 1 can be expressed by: (6) can be rewritten as:
By assuming firm 1 and firm 2 are identical, the first-order condition of equation (2) can be presented by 9) :
In contrast, if information security investments result in positive externalities, the second class of the security breach probability functions can be rewritten using equations (6) and (11) 
In order to compare the optimal levels of information security investment for the second class of security breach probability function in case of the different types of the externalities, I
confer numerical values on ,  and   in equations (7), (15) and (17) is smaller comparing to the other cases.
This proposition implies that, although information sets have either extremely low or high vulnerability, information security investment with negative externalities can be justified because the marginal benefits of expending money on information security of this area is relatively high compared to the other cases.
12) Using the conferred numerical values, it is identified that, in the case of negative externalities,
Second, in addition to the impact on the size of zero investment area, interdependent security risks affect the optimal level of investment in information security as shown in <Figure 3> and 4: if security investments generate negative externalities, the optimal security investment is higher than or equal to the other cases, whereas the optimal level of security investment is lower than or equal to the other cases if security investments bring in positive externalities. This relationship between the optimal level of investment in security and interdependent security risks can be stated as:
The optimal level of investment in the case of negative externalities is higher than or equal to the optimal level of investment in the case of independent security risks, while the optimal level of investment in the case of positive externalities is lower than or equal the optimal level of investment in the case of independent security risks (See Appendix for a formal proof).
The next proposition provides insight into the relationship between the optimal level of investment in security and the loss that would be expected in the absence of any investment in security when the security breach probability functions belong to class I or class II. 
Ⅳ. Conclusion and Future Work
The rapid development of networking technologies has been important enablers of highly productivity business processes. However, as organizations become more reliant on these technologies, they become highly susceptible to information security breaches and associated losses. [20] Zhao, X., Xue, L., and Whinston, A., "Manag- For class II, using the optimal levels of security investments from Equations (7), (15) The right hand side of (A.6) is increasing .
Applying L'Hospital's rule, we have: Hence, the right hand side of (A.6) is less than 
